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ORGANIZATION AND INNOVATION
n 2015, the Secretary of the Navy asserted that the F-35 likely would be the last 
manned fighter aircraft the Navy would buy, and the Department of Defense 
(DoD) embarked on a Third Offset Strategy that plans to leverage unmanned and 
autonomous systems (UASs) and human-machine teams to ensure technologi-
cal superiority over potential adversaries�1 Yet in spite of significant advances in 
robotics, artificial intelligence, and UAS technology, the Navy’s unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) remain predominantly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) assets, and none are carrier based� Effective employment of UAVs by 
the Navy’s carrier air wings requires more than the acquisition of new technology, 
and without focused efforts to accelerate integration it likely will take several more 
decades before carrier-launched UAVs (CL-UAVs) are optimized across the entire 
spectrum of carrier aviation missions� Throughout history, organizational changes 
have been instrumental to enhancing the effectiveness of military technology� 
The integration of CL-UAVs can be accelerated by 
making organizational changes that facilitate the 
development of an internal constituency within the 
carrier aviation community and foster experimen-
tation and bottom-up innovation�2
It has been one hundred years since Secretary 
of the Navy Josephus Daniels authorized the 
U�S� Navy’s first investment in UAVs�3 During 
World War II, the Navy became the first service 
to use UAVs in combat, employing TDR-1 as-
sault drones at Bougainville and Balalai Islands in 
1944�4 These early UAV investments contributed 
I
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to the development of target drones in the 1920s and ’30s, then cruise missiles 
in the 1950s and ’60s� However, with the exception of these two mission areas, 
neither of which required the aircraft to return safely after a mission, naval avia-
tion’s manned aircraft have outperformed unmanned systems� Even when high 
casualty rates for reconnaissance aircraft and crews during the Cold War and 
Vietnam conflict led the U�S� Air Force to invest heavily in UAVs and satellites, 
the Navy eschewed significant investment in UAVs, especially for carrier-based 
operations�5
The U�S� military has operated UAVs continuously since World War II, and 
today all services employ UAVs in some capacity� The most extensive operational 
employment of UAVs during the twentieth century involved the Air Force’s de-
rivatives of Ryan Firebee target drones, which executed more than 3,400 recon-
naissance “sorties over North Vietnam and China in the 1960s and early 1970s�”6 
The U�S� Navy did employ UAVs, such as the QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine 
Helicopter (DASH) between 1960 and 1971 and the RQ-2 Pioneer beginning 
in 1986, but these were developed to meet narrow mission requirements of the 
surface fleet and were never integrated into naval aviation� Since the 1990s, UAVs 
have demonstrated increasing reliability and utility in combat, and have become 
integral to ISR and counterterrorism missions around the globe� The Navy has 
accumulated more than 26,000 flight hours in its two largest UAV programs, the 
MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4C Triton, but neither operates from the centerpiece 
of naval aviation—the aircraft carrier�7
There are many reasons the U�S� Navy has not fielded a CL-UAV yet, but 
certainly technological immaturity long rendered tactically effective naval UAVs 
cost prohibitive, and the additional performance requirements for carrier avia-
tion exacerbated the cost-capability dilemma that plagued nearly all large UAV 
programs in the twentieth century�8 The Navy’s dismal experience with its first 
unmanned helicopter, the QH-50 DASH, of which nearly 50 percent were lost in 
peacetime accidents, highlighted the technological shortcomings of shipboard 
UAVs and may have contributed to a bias for manned aircraft among both surface 
warfare officers and aviators�9 However, in 2004 a Defense Science Board task 
force concluded, “There is no longer any question of the technical viability and 
operational utility of UAVs,” and a 2008 study coauthored by Robert O� Work, 
now Deputy Secretary of Defense, observed that “the combat value of unmanned 
aircraft is no longer much debated�”10 A CL-UAV has been in various stages of 
research and development since 1999, but fiscal constraints and prioritization of 
other naval aviation requirements have slowed its development, even though the 
rise of great-power competitors and the proliferation of antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD) capabilities pose the most significant challenges to carrier air wing op-
erations since World War II� As DoD embarks on a Third Offset Strategy that is 
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based on human-machine teams, the aircraft carrier and its air wing—together, 
the centerpiece of U�S� power projection for nearly seventy-five years—must 
adapt to integrate CL-UAVs�
Optimizing the military effectiveness of CL-UAVs involves much more than 
the introduction of a new platform� The Navy made important organizational 
changes to sustain and improve UAV development in recent years and is on pace 
to deliver the carrier-launched MQ-25 Stingray by 2020; in a competitive fiscal 
environment, merely programming a CL-UAV is something of a bureaucratic 
accomplishment� However, it represents only one step toward realizing the po-
tential of the CL-UAV innovation, which still faces institutional and cultural bar-
riers� Organizing to support the development of a CL-UAV constituency within 
the carrier aviation community will facilitate adoption and integration of the new 
technology, and organizations that enable experimentation and exploit end-user 
innovation will accelerate the development of innovative operating concepts and 
follow-on requirements that will optimize its effectiveness�
TECHNOLOGY, ORGANIZATION, AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
The ultimate goal of pursuing and acquiring CL-UAVs, or any new military 
technology, is to increase military effectiveness�11 George Raudzens observed 
that even significant technological advantages merely influence the way wars are 
fought, rather than the “outcomes of combat�”12 Stephen Biddle has argued that 
force employment was as much the key to the success of the U�S�-led coalition 
during the 1991 Gulf War as was technological superiority�13 Although there is 
room for disagreement with these well-defended assertions, there is little doubt 
that the utility of a new weapon system in combat depends as much on the train-
ing of associated personnel, the system’s interoperability with other systems, the 
ability to support and maintain it in sufficient numbers, and the development of 
appropriate doctrine, operational concepts, and tactics as it does on the system’s 
technological superiority� Organization greatly influences all these elements, 
from the unit to service levels, and therefore is integral to optimizing the ef-
fectiveness of the technology� The hoplite phalanx that optimized the shield and 
spear and Napoleon’s corps d’armée that enhanced employment of artillery, infan-
try, and cavalry illustrate the influence of organization on military effectiveness�
Furthermore, greater technological leaps may necessitate a more significant 
departure from traditional organizational constructs to optimize employment�14 
As Edward Luttwak has argued, “If the new is a real innovation, not just a new 
model, � � � then the armed forces must change their structure to absorb it, usu-
ally by creating new units�”15 For example, the U�S� Air Force (and its predeces-
sor, the Army Air Corps) and U�S� Cyber Command were created to facilitate 
the application of new technologies to warfare� It remains to be seen whether 
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CL-UAV optimization will require new units or merely the introduction of CL-
UAV platforms into existing organizations� The U�S� Air Force created an entire 
air wing with subordinate squadrons to employ its remotely piloted aircraft, but 
also found it necessary to assign some remotely piloted aircraft squadrons to 
fighter wings� The Navy created a new squadron to operate the MQ-4C Triton as 
a subordinate command under an existing maritime patrol and reconnaissance 
wing; after originally planning independent MQ-8 Fire Scout units, it now is 
assigning the rotary-wing UAV to existing helicopter squadrons� These organi-
zational decisions are driven by considerations of cost, safety, and manpower, 
with the unstated goal of minimally disrupting current operations, but they also 
should take into account how organization will influence military effectiveness 
over the long term�
Failing to make organizational changes or making poor organizational de-
cisions can reduce the military effectiveness of new technology drastically� In 
the case of the French introduction of a carriage-mounted machine gun, the 
mitrailleuse, in 1870, poor organization not only prevented optimization of 
the weapon but completely negated its technological advantage� Prior to the 
Franco-Prussian War, the French secretly procured the mitrailleuse, which was 
capable of accurately firing three hundred rounds per minute to ranges of five 
hundred meters—a vast improvement over existing weaponry�16 However, the 
French army assigned the mitrailleuse to the artillery, largely on the basis of the 
capacity of that branch to provide the necessary logistical support (e�g�, wagons 
and horses that could transport the weapon and its ammunition), without due 
consideration to how the weapon would be employed on the battlefield or how 
its firepower could alter fundamentally the way the infantry engaged in combat� 
Although the mitrailleuse provided the French with sufficient firepower to repel 
Prussian infantry, the weapon remained with the artillery—which, in keeping 
with doctrine, was positioned behind the infantry on the field of battle�17 In that 
position, the mitrailleuse rarely could be brought to bear on the enemy without 
fratricide until the Prussians had broken through the French infantry lines� Orga-
nizational changes would have been required to provide the necessary logistics to 
the infantry or to modify artillery employment doctrine� Assigning the weapon 
system to the “wrong” branch and failing to make organizational changes negated 
the firepower advantages of the mitrailleuse and drastically reduced its military 
effectiveness�18
Effective military innovation is a continuous process that is rarely complete 
before the end user employs new technology in combat or realistic exercises� 
In the case of the mitrailleuse, the project’s extreme secrecy prevented end us-
ers from performing the experimentation and concept development that likely 
would have identified the need for organizational or doctrinal changes� There is 
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a substantial body of literature that analyzes military innovation and the factors 
that aid or hinder the adoption of technology�19 In a 2006 review of that litera-
ture, Adam Grissom highlighted a lack of analysis of bottom-up innovation�20 He 
described the U�S� Army’s experience with the Force XXI initiative to illustrate 
how users employed the system’s chat, e-mail, and moving-map capabilities in 
combat in ways the system’s designers never envisioned� He also observed that 
this end-user influence mirrored what was being discussed in scientific and tech-
nical literature about bottom-up innovation in the commercial sector�21 Since that 
observation, much of the innovation literature has used bottom-up innovation 
or adaptation to explain commercial and military changes, and it suggests an im-
portant and perhaps increasing role of the end user in technological innovation�22
In an environment of rapidly changing and proliferating technology, there is 
a natural tendency to refine a system continuously in the laboratory, attempting 
to incorporate all the latest scientific and technical advances before releasing it 
to the operators; but definitive innovations may not occur before the end user 
has adopted that technology and applied it for tactical advantage� In Grissom’s 
words, “the impact of a new technology, doctrine, or organizational schema may 
not solely be in the hands of the senior officers and civilians�”23 Those making 
organizational decisions regarding the MQ-25 Stingray and future CL-UAVs 
should consider the likelihood that innovation will continue and may accelerate 
when the UAVs are introduced to the fleet�
In the past, the U�S� Navy demonstrated a willingness to explore the potential 
of unmanned platforms to solve unique tactical or operational challenges of the 
surface fleet—and a tendency to abandon UAVs in favor of competing manned 
platforms or more reliable and affordable alternatives as soon as those were 
available� The individual decisions, such as the one to cancel the QH-50 DASH, 
were influenced by poor reliability and technological immaturity, but they also 
contributed to a clear preference for manned aircraft in the Navy� Subsequent 
technological improvements have been insufficient to ensure adoption of UAVs 
by carrier aviators, so senior leaders have found it necessary to make policy and 
organizational changes to preserve the Navy’s UAV development and accelerate 
the acquisition of supporting technologies� Additional organizational changes 
will be necessary to optimize the military effectiveness of CL-UAVs�
ORGANIZING TO SUPPORT UAV PROGRAMS
Bureaucratic organizations such as the military services tend to preserve the sta-
tus quo and resist disruptive changes� As a result, peacetime military innovation, 
if it occurs at all, usually is an evolutionary process� Adopting new approaches 
during peacetime usually requires clear recognition of a changing security en-
vironment, an outside threat, or strong top-down leadership�24 Even though the 
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United States has been at war for the past fifteen years, its air superiority has 
not been challenged, and therefore there has been no natural motivation for the 
carrier air wing to adopt disruptive innovations such as UAVs into all carrier air 
wing missions� Some have argued that the growing threat that A2/AD technolo-
gies pose to the survivability of the carrier air wing warrants greater prioritization 
of CL-UAVs�25 However, the carrier air wings plan to address the A2/AD threat 
through weapon system improvements, including next-generation manned 
aircraft, and new countermeasures rather than through integrating UAVs or 
disruptive technologies that might require a more dramatic shift in war-fighting 
concepts�
The introduction of CL-UAVs is essentially a peacetime innovation that is pro-
ceeding at an evolutionary pace and has required strong leadership to overcome 
institutional and cultural barriers to change� UAV development has benefited 
from technological advances in navigation, communications, autonomy, and 
computer processing, as well as strong support from senior DoD and congres-
sional leaders for most of the past fifteen years; but to ensure program survival, 
especially in competitive budget environments, organizational changes have been 
necessary�
In 2015, the Navy created the office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Unmanned Systems (DASN UxS) and the Unmanned Warfare Systems Direc-
torate (OPNAV N99) to coordinate better the disparate efforts to develop UASs to 
support naval operations in the air, land, surface, and subsurface environments� 
These changes reflect the commitment of civilian and military leaders to achiev-
ing a technological advantage over adversaries through UASs� The centralization 
of authority and accountability for immature unmanned systems under OPNAV 
N99 removed risky investments from the budgets and portfolios of the other 
warfare directorates and provided the opportunity to expedite the acquisition 
of UASs and supporting technology and to ensure their technological readiness 
prior to commencing initial production�26 It also facilitated the authorization of 
additional funding for Navy UASs in the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Au-
thorization Act�27
However, neither DASN UxS nor OPNAV N99 is adequately manned or re-
sourced for the task of fully integrating unmanned systems�28 The establishment 
of such offices reflects the high priority senior leaders place on acquiring inno-
vative unmanned and autonomous technology, but, as discussed previously, the 
acquisition of technology is only one aspect of successful military innovation� 
Even though the Director for Unmanned Warfare Systems will play a critical 
role in evaluating prototypes and ensuring the technological readiness of UASs, 
OPNAV N99 lacks the authority over manpower and organizational decisions 
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that ultimately will determine the pace of integration and the effectiveness of the 
new technologies�
Prior to the establishment of OPNAV N99, the Navy found it necessary to 
insulate unmanned platforms from direct budget competition with manned plat-
forms� To accomplish this, the Navy assigned responsibility for unmanned pro-
grams to the Director for Information Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6) rather than 
the Director for Air Warfare (OPNAV N98)� This organizational construct has 
been reflected formally in the Navy Program Guide since 2012, when coverage of 
all Navy UAV programs of record moved from the Naval Aviation / Aircraft sec-
tion to the Information Dominance / ISR section of the report�29 OPNAV N2/N6 
is responsible for providing ISR capabilities to support fleet and combatant com-
manders, and UAVs are an effective way to do so� OPNAV N2/N6 also is respon-
sible for the command, control, communications, and information systems that 
are essential to the performance of networked UASs�30 So it is not unreasonable 
for UAV requirements to be addressed by OPNAV N2/N6, even though OPNAV 
N98 is responsible for the majority of naval aviation programs, including aircraft 
carriers and most manned aircraft�
Locating UAVs organizationally in the OPNAV N2/N6 portfolio essentially 
reduces direct budget competition with manned aircraft (for missions other than 
ISR) and has facilitated UAV development and initial procurement� In spite of 
the challenging fiscal constraints of recent years and the need to recapitalize the 
majority of naval aviation’s manned platforms, the decision to cut or delay UAV 
programs to sustain the procurement of manned aircraft could be made only at 
the highest levels�
However, the assignment of UAV requirements to OPNAV N2/N6 perpetuates 
the perception that naval UASs are “only” ISR assets� This artificially channels 
UAVs toward the ISR mission, inherently restricting UAV integration across the 
spectrum of carrier air wing missions� This raises the question whether assigning 
the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) or follow-
on CL-UAVs to OPNAV N2/N6 is analogous to assigning the mitrailleuse to 
the French artillery in 1870� Is the Navy limiting the military effectiveness of its 
UAVs by making organizational decisions on the basis of the perception that they 
will remain ISR platforms, without due consideration of how CL-UAVs could be 
employed in other carrier air wing missions?
Perceptions about the role(s) of CL-UAVs also influence decision making 
about organization and manpower for CL-UAVs at the unit and wing levels� 
Ultimately, the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), who typically is a carrier 
aviator from the strike fighter community, will determine the structure of CL-
UAV units� CNAF balances manpower requirements to support UAVs with those 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   85 4/21/17   8:35 AM
7
Smith: Organization and Innovation
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 8 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
for aircraft carriers and manned aircraft units� The Director for Air Warfare is 
the resource sponsor for the vast majority of the naval aviation budget, including 
manpower, but, as noted previously, is not responsible for UAV programs� This 
structure, combined with the perception that UAVs are ISR-only assets, creates 
institutional challenges to prioritizing manpower and organizational support for 
UAVs, especially for missions other than ISR�31
In sum, the organizational changes the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) made in recent years were designed to ensure the con-
tinuation of UAV programs and to influence the acquisition of innovative UAS 
technology in the face of bureaucratic and institutional resistance� By separating 
UAVs from other air warfare requirements, the Navy distributed financial and 
technical risk to (and therefore resistance from) influential parts of the Navy’s 
bureaucracy� These changes will continue to facilitate the introduction of new 
unmanned and autonomous systems for ISR missions, but the institutional sepa-
ration of UAVs from much of the carrier aviation community perpetuates the 
perception of UAVs as external, ISR-only assets�
Therefore, integrating CL-UAVs across carrier aviation missions will require 
deliberate efforts to overcome institutional and cultural perceptions� Historically, 
optimization and integration of technological innovations have been facilitated 
by creating an internal constituency and conducting experimentation that en-
courages bottom-up innovation�
ORGANIZING TO DEVELOP AN INTERNAL CONSTITUENCY
In his doctoral dissertation on UAV weapon system innovation, Thomas Ehr-
hard explains that “although external advocates and agencies undoubtedly play 
an important role in weapon system development and adoption, the symbiosis 
between service and machine required for combat innovation depends on the 
mobilization of an internal constituency�”32 Ehrhard is referring to the inadequa-
cies of joint acquisition programs that plagued UAV development following the 
enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, but the same is true within the 
Navy as various internal constituencies vie for a portion of a finite budget� The 
establishment of OPNAV N99 and DASN UxS created external advocates for 
unmanned systems, but not constituents within the carrier aviation community� 
Stephen Rosen explains in Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern 
Military that developing such a constituency to support a technological innova-
tion typically requires a generation—the amount of time it takes for the junior 
officers who operated the technology in combat to rise through the ranks to 
positions of influence�33
Ehrhard also argues that “full integration includes the establishment of 
dedicated units, the adoption of follow-on systems, and the development of a 
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dedicated officer constituency�”34 An internal officer constituency is critical in 
the face of cultural or institutional resistance because it can advocate for program 
continuation, explain system shortcomings, identify requirements to improve the 
technology, develop new operating concepts, and be held accountable for success 
or failure� The fact that past UAV programs have failed to develop an internal 
officer constituency within naval aviation may have contributed to their failure 
to endure�
The Navy’s first combat UAV, the TDR-1 assault drone that was used against Jap-
anese targets in the Solomon Islands in 1944, did develop an officer constituency 
—but for guided missiles, as opposed to UAVs� After successful demonstra-
tions in early 1942, Commander Delmar S� Fahrney was assigned as program 
manager of Project OPTION� Leveraging the latest television technology from 
Radio Corporation of America (i�e�, RCA), OPTION developed the TDR-1, which 
was guided remotely by pilots in the rear seats of specially configured TBM-1C 
Avengers�35 The mixed combat performance of the assault drones (thirty-one of 
fifty struck their poorly defended targets, and fewer than half inflicted meaning-
ful damage) encouraged its advocates regarding the viability of the concept but 
failed to gain the support of carrier aviators� The assault drone program was 
canceled in September 1944 owing to a combination of technological immaturity 
and competition from other platforms�36 However, the experience with Project 
OPTION developed a constituency of officers and technical experts who became 
the lead advocates for the development of guided missiles� Fahrney went on to 
command the Naval Missile Test Center at Point Mugu, California (now the Na-
val Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division), retired at the rank of rear admiral, 
and has been called the “Father of the Guided Missile�”37
In spite of eight years of operationally employing the QH-50 DASH, no inter-
nal officer constituency developed� To the contrary, DASH was rejected by both 
the surface and aviation communities� Aviators were wary of flying in proxim-
ity to the drones and often discouraged their integration into fleet operations� 
The surface community was not committed to training its personnel to operate 
the UAVs, and ship captains who employed the unreliable drones risked being 
held accountable for their many failures�38 Overcoming DASH’s technical short-
comings would have required a strong constituency to advocate for expensive 
improvements to its control systems or extensive training for personnel� The 
development of antisubmarine rockets, which gave the surface Navy the ability 
to attack submarines at range, and Light Airborne Multipurpose System (i�e�, 
LAMPS) helicopters, which provided an officer constituency that integrated 
the manned platform into fleet operations and could be held accountable for 
mishaps, offered suitable alternatives to DASH, which were preferred by both 
aviators and surface warfare officers�39 Lack of technological reliability was the 
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most important impediment to DASH’s acceptance, but without developing an 
internal officer constituency the innovation would not have been integrated into 
naval aviation even if it had been more reliable� A quick comparison between 
the respective integrations of the RQ-2 Pioneer into the Navy and Marine Corps 
further illustrates this point�
The establishment of dedicated units contributed to development of an inter-
nal constituency for small, tactical UASs (STUASs) and enabled Marine Corps 
aviation to integrate the RQ-2 Pioneer and follow-on platforms� The Navy and 
Marine Corps acquired Pioneer in the 1980s, and both employed the system dur-
ing the 1991 Gulf War� The Marine Corps established remotely piloted vehicle 
(RPV) companies under its surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence groups� 
Then, in the mid-1990s, the RPV companies became Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Squadron 1 (VMU-1)� Integration continued as two VMUs were established and 
assigned to Marine aircraft-control groups, and today they are being integrated 
into Marine aircraft groups with other fixed-wing aircraft� The Marine Corps’s 
stated objective for STUASs is for them to “play a key role in all USMC missions 
across the range of military operations, to include forward presence, security 
cooperation, counterterrorism, crisis response, forcible entry, prolonged op-
erations, and counterinsurgency�”40 This should not imply that the integration of 
UAVs into Marine aviation has been seamless, but—especially when compared 
with the Navy’s experience with the same platform—it demonstrates the value 
of establishing a constituency of dedicated units to support the UAV innovation�
The Navy, which acquired Pioneer to provide reconnaissance and targeting 
support for its battleships, employed aviators to run Pioneer detachments but did 
not establish dedicated UAV squadrons� When the battleships were decommis-
sioned, the Navy lacked an internal constituency to support follow-on models, 
so since the mid-1990s the RQ-2 has been used primarily as a test and evalua-
tion platform�41 Certainly there were other factors, such as cost, unique mission 
requirements, and the post–Cold War security environment, that influenced the 
rate of integration of Pioneer into the Navy and Marine Corps aviation commu-
nities, but the fact that the service that developed an internal constituency with 
dedicated aviation units also better sustained and integrated the innovation is an 
important correlation�
In addition to a service’s establishing dedicated units, Ehrhard argues that 
to explore the utility of UAVs and completely integrate them into the service, 
UAV operators should remain a part of their aviation subgroup and maintain 
“currency in manned flight operations [to] develop their aviation professional-
ism and give them some credibility when teamed with rated pilots on staffs�”42 
Written more than a decade prior to the restrictions of the Budget Control Act 
of 2011 and the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, these sentiments represent an 
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unachievable ideal for the naval aviation community in 2017�43 However, still 
relevant is the need to ensure that UAV operators possess sufficient credibility to 
positively influence interoperability across the air wing and adequate experience 
to develop effective operating concepts and tactics� Attracting qualified person-
nel who are also competitive for future promotion will be critical to developing 
the internal constituency and will enhance greatly the integration of the CL-UAV�
The U�S� Air Force has taken deliberate steps to create an internal constituency 
for its remotely piloted aircraft—with mixed results� The Air Force originally 
employed pilots from other communities to operate its remotely piloted aircraft 
(RPA)� Many who were competitive for promotion within their original com-
munities were able to stay on track for continued promotion and command; for 
example, the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Goldfein, 
lists the MQ-9 in his official biography among the aircraft he has piloted�44 The 
number of RPA pilots in the Air Force is increasing, but there remain manpower 
and organizational challenges that have required significant policy adjustments, 
including creating an RPA pilot officer community, increasing incentive pay 
for RPA pilots, and authorizing enlisted airmen to serve as RQ-4 Global Hawk 
pilots�45 It is unclear whether RPA pilots will be competitive for wing command 
or promotion to the highest levels�46 It also is not yet possible to determine how 
separating RPA pilots from the fighter and bomber communities will influence 
the integration of UASs into non-ISR missions� In spite of these challenges, there 
is little doubt about the Air Force’s commitment to UAV integration�47 Navy and 
Air Force war-fighting requirements and officer career paths are distinct, but 
additional analysis of Air Force organizational decisions regarding UASs may 
provide insights for the Navy�
Thoughtful organization can provide incentives for highly qualified naval 
aviators, including both pilots and naval flight officers, to pursue assignments in 
UAV units� In a study of military aviators published in 2007, James FitzSimonds 
and Thomas Mahnken found that opportunities for promotion and command 
were likely adequate and provided key incentives for “drawing junior officers into 
new operational specialties” such as UAVs�48 Command at sea remains the pri-
mary goal and the key to continued promotion for career-oriented naval officers� 
Therefore, the Navy should articulate viable career paths for officers assigned to 
duties operating CL-UAVs�
Organizational changes, such as establishing separate CL-UAV squadrons, can 
provide additional command opportunities for CL-UAV aviators� As Stingray 
is introduced to the fleet or CL-UAV units are established, consideration also 
should be given to processes and career timing that will enable junior officers to 
complete successful tours in manned platforms, operate CL-UAVs in subsequent 
tours, and return to manned platforms as department heads and commanding 
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officers� This will both enhance integration between manned and unmanned 
units and ensure that officers assigned to operate CL-UAVs remain competitive 
for command� To accomplish these objectives so as to support the introduction 
of the MQ-4C Triton, which theoretically can be controlled from anywhere via 
satellite, the maritime patrol community intends to man its operational Triton 
squadrons with aircrews on shore duty so they can continue to achieve their 
critical sea-duty milestones in manned maritime patrol and reconnaissance 
squadrons�49 Employing officers on shore duty likely will not be an option for 
carrier-based units, so other solutions will be required� In any event, CL-UAV 
operators will need viable career paths if they are to form an influential constitu-
ency within the carrier aviation community�
If separate CL-UAV units are created, consideration should be given to es-
tablishing CL-UAV squadrons as commander (O-5) at-sea commands to attract 
top aviators and facilitate the development of an internal constituency whose 
members are competitive for promotion to captain (O-6)�50 Another option 
would be to select postcommand commanders who are already competitive for 
promotion to fill the initial officer-in-charge or squadron commanding officer 
roles, to build a senior internal constituency rapidly� Thoughtful organizational 
decisions could attract high-quality officers and greatly facilitate the creation of 
an internal constituency to support the development of operating concepts and 
follow-on platform requirements�
In making organizational decisions, the naval aviation community should ver-
ify assumptions about the professional desires of junior officers and assess their 
impact on the fleet’s UAV manpower over the long term� Many have argued that 
aviators have not integrated UAVs readily because the systems challenge what it 
means to be an aviator and a warfighter�51 Stereotypes suggest that aviators always 
will avoid assignments that keep them out of the cockpit� However, neither factor 
emerged as the most significant barrier to UAV acceptance in the comprehensive 
historical review of empirical analysis of officer attitudes toward UAVs reviewed 
during this study�52 A 2006 survey of “400 officers with aviation specialties” that 
examined their perceptions of the impact of UAV adoption revealed that “avia-
tors had attitudes that diverged markedly from popular stereotypes�”53 This does 
not mean there is no resistance to weapon system innovation among aviators, but 
it does suggest that failure to integrate UAVs into carrier aviation is not simply 
the result of irrational responses by carrier aviators� Therefore, organizational 
changes that are informed by empirical understanding of cultural and institution-
al barriers instead of stereotypes can be effective mechanisms for developing an 
internal officer constituency to support the integration of CL-UAVs� Additional 
empirical analysis to refine the conclusions of previous studies would provide 
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insights into the types of organizational changes that would facilitate best the 
adoption and integration of CL-UAVs by carrier aviators�
Naval aviation has the opportunity to create organizations that will facilitate 
the integration of the MQ-25 Stingray and future UASs� Certainly, establishing 
Stingray units under existing carrier air wings and assigning Stingray platforms 
to existing squadrons should be explored� Organizing with the goal of developing 
an officer constituency within carrier aviation will complement the organization-
al changes at higher levels that preserve funding and facilitate the acquisition of 
UAS technologies� An internal constituency would advocate for improvements to 
the MQ-25 Stingray and for increasingly effective follow-on models� The optimal 
constituency also would enable the integration of CL-UAVs into all carrier air 
wing missions� Integrating a new technology, such as the CL-UAV, and develop-
ing a constituency for it during peacetime typically require a generation� CL-UAV 
integration can be accelerated by encouraging experimentation and adopting 
bottom-up innovations�
ORGANIZING TO ENCOURAGE EXPERIMENTATION AND  
DEVELOP INNOVATIVE OPERATING CONCEPTS
Developing effective operating concepts involves the employment of technol-
ogy in realistic conditions, typically during combat or military exercises� Initial 
operating concepts are developed to inform the design of new technology, but 
innovation continues for years (sometimes decades) after technology reaches the 
end user� Eliot Cohen, writing about the U�S� Army in Afghanistan in 2001 and in 
Iraq in 2003, observed a lag between the introduction of information technology 
and the related organizational and operational concept development� He argued 
that “[t]hroughout most of military history, to include the current period, change 
tends to come more from below, from the spontaneous interactions between 
military people, technology, and particular tactical circumstances�”54 This is 
entirely consistent with the observations of Grissom and others discussed previ-
ously who have explored the phenomenon of bottom-up innovation� In a similar 
way, integrating and optimizing the effectiveness of CL-UAVs across all carrier 
air wing missions will require adopting input from end users� The Navy should 
consider how organizational changes can expedite and facilitate experimentation 
and bottom-up innovation�
CNO Admiral John M� Richardson embraced the role of end-user or bottom-
up innovation in explaining a recent decision to revise the requirements for the 
UCLASS program� The low-observable and deep-strike capabilities that were 
envisioned when the program was known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air 
System (i�e�, J-UCAS) in 2003 were removed in the latest request for proposals 
NWC_Summer2017Review.indb   91 4/21/17   8:35 AM
13
Smith: Organization and Innovation
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 9 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
for the MQ-25 Stingray�55 In March 2016, Richardson explained, “It will get us 
unmanned on deck � � � so we can start to confront those operational challenges 
and we can learn our way forward�”56 Introducing the MQ-25 as a refueling and 
reconnaissance CL-UAV provides the Navy with the opportunity to explore orga-
nizational, manpower, logistics, and operating challenges, while building confi-
dence in the ability to execute closely coordinated carrier operations� It certainly 
will result in significant end-user innovation�
However, it would be a mistake to assume that getting the MQ-25 Stingray 
safely to the fleet will deliver desired advances in military effectiveness automati-
cally� The Navy’s official goal for the UCLASS program remains an “autonomous 
aircraft capable of precision strike in a contested environment,” as the Secretary 
of the Navy described in 2014�57 Therefore, organizations that are sufficient for 
the integration of the MQ-25 as an ISR and aerial refueling platform might not 
be sufficient to support simultaneously the development of innovative operating 
concepts or to refine requirements for follow-on CL-UAVs that will be employed 
across the full spectrum of carrier aviation missions� To balance these competing 
demands, it may be necessary to create organizations dedicated to experimenta-
tion for both the Stingray and follow-on CL-UAVs�
Experimentation can be the key to developing optimal operating concepts� Se-
nior leaders in DoD in fact have called for greater experimentation, for increased 
use of war games, for “failing fast,” and for innovation at every level� There 
are institutional and cultural barriers to such an approach, but organizational 
changes could facilitate overcoming these barriers� Requiring a squadron, air 
wing, or ship to take on the risk of experimentation and primary responsibility 
for developing operating concepts for CL-UAVs without alleviating other prede-
ployment or operational requirements places an additional burden on an already 
overstressed force�
Today, the Navy is unable to meet combatant commander demands fully, 
not only for carrier strike group presence, but for ISR and maritime patrol as-
sets, exercise participation, and the like� The need for and development of the 
Optimized Fleet Response Plan, the carrier gap in the Persian Gulf in the fall 
of 2015, and the extension of aircraft carrier deployments are all symptoms of 
a force stretched thin� However, failing to prioritize experimentation cannot be 
attributed wholly to operational requirements� The Navy also proved unable to 
experiment effectively during the 1990s when the fleet was much larger than it is 
today and faced fewer urgent threats and operational commitments� As Robert 
C� Rubel testified to the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the 
House Armed Services Committee in February 2016, “Despite all the lip service 
that has been paid to innovation and concept development over the past twenty 
years, the Navy has not been able to free up significant forces for experimentation 
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duty�”58 This is consistent with the findings of another Mahnken and FitzSimonds 
study, published in 2003, which found that officers “were unwilling to support 
tradeoffs between force structure and readiness, on the one hand, and investment 
in transformation, on the other�”59 At that time, the emergence of a near-peer 
competitor was still a decade away, but the pressure on units to meet current mis-
sions impeded investment in or experimentation with future capabilities� Simi-
larly, budget limitations cannot take all the blame for the lack of experimentation� 
The successful Fleet Problem series of exercises and experiments were begun in 
1923 on a tight budget and continued during the Great Depression, albeit by a 
Navy with fewer obligations around the globe�60 Clearly, there is institutional or 
cultural resistance to diverting Navy resources to large-scale experimentation, 
even though such experimentation is recognized widely as required to optimize 
technology�
The CL-UAV provides a superb basis around which to build new organiza-
tions dedicated to experimentation and rapid adoption of bottom-up innova-
tions� There is a strategic need to accelerate the integration of CL-UAVs and 
rapidly identify and articulate the requirements for follow-on UASs, such as the 
unmanned combat air vehicle (i�e�, UCAV) envisioned in the early part of this 
century� There is also broad support for CL-UAV innovation from senior civil-
ians in DoD and Congress� The Navy should explore organizational changes that 
encourage greater experimentation and rapid concept development�
Naval aviation’s strike fighter community already supports expedited refine-
ment of technical requirements on a small scale by employing new technology 
in its aggressor squadron aircraft at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 
(NSAWC) in Nevada� These limited efforts provide rapid feedback to systems 
engineers by allowing experienced aviators to employ new technology in sce-
narios that reflect the anticipated operating environment� Unfortunately, with 
UAVs seen as ISR assets that are operated by personnel outside the carrier air 
wing, there is little internal incentive to prioritize experimentation at NSAWC 
with UAVs in non-ISR roles� This experimentation also is not something a fleet 
squadron is organized to do, operating as it does with inexperienced aviators and 
the minimal required personnel, aircraft, and flight hours to meet established 
training and readiness standards� Therefore, dedicated experimentation units 
may be required�
Many will argue that such experimentation is the purview of Naval Air Sys-
tems Command (NAVAIR), and indeed NAVAIR is critical to operational and 
developmental testing� However, NAVAIR ensures that new technology and 
platforms meet minimum standards; it is not organized to conduct extensive 
experimentation dedicated to identifying entirely new operating concepts� Navy 
test and evaluation squadrons are tied to programs of record and acquisition 
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milestones� Engineers and test pilots have much to contribute to the acquisition 
of UAS technology, but expanding the role of NAVAIR could perpetuate the per-
ception that speeding up technology acquisition is the silver bullet of CL-UAV 
integration� A better approach would involve new or repurposed experimenta-
tion units that are not focused on operational readiness or program acquisition�
Even if new experimental units cannot be established, the need to develop in-
novative operating concepts and identify requirements for CL-UAVs of the future 
will remain� Given DoD’s stated intention to pursue human-machine teaming 
for future warfare, it would be wise to include officers from all carrier aviation 
communities in the development of such concepts and requirements, especially 
if Stingray is limited to ISR and aerial refueling missions� This is contrary to the 
model planned for the MQ-8 Fire Scout and MQ-4C Triton, which relies primar-
ily on one or two communities to take ownership of UAV integration; but those 
are both ISR platforms� CL-UAV optimization will require expertise from across 
the spectrum of carrier air wing missions�
Consider the likely possibility that the unmanned ISR and aerial refueling mis-
sion would be assigned to the airborne early warning (VAW) community� While 
the VAW community, which currently operates the E-2 Hawkeye, might absorb 
these missions readily and employ the MQ-25 Stingray innovatively in support 
of air wing datalink and battle-space management requirements, its members 
are less well suited to develop the CL-UAV requirements and operational con-
cepts required for conducting unmanned deep strikes or jamming in an A2/AD 
environment than are the pilots and naval flight officers from the strike fighter 
(VFA) or electronic attack (VAQ) communities�61 Assigning CL-UAVs to a single 
community that readily accepts them likely would contribute to building an 
internal constituency, but it also could detract from the development of follow-
on requirements for CL-UAVs integrated across all air wing missions� Stingray 
organizations should facilitate the participation of all aviation communities, es-
pecially the strike fighter community, to optimize the effectiveness of follow-on 
CL-UAVs� Units comprising officers from all carrier air wing communities would 
support that objective�
As the naval aviation community assesses the trade-offs of various organiza-
tional options, it should consider the effect of organizational decisions on the 
pace of integration across all air wing missions and how new organizations can 
influence experimentation and bottom-up innovation�
The U�S� Navy, which operated its first UAV in combat in 1944, is still more than 
a generation away from fully integrating CL-UAVs across the spectrum of car-
rier air wing missions� Advances in data communications, computer processing, 
navigation, and autonomy have overcome technological barriers to employing a 
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tactically effective CL-UAV, but they have done little to address the institutional 
and cultural barriers to innovation within the carrier aviation community� Opti-
mizing the military effectiveness of the CL-UAV innovation will require contin-
ued top-down leadership and additional organizational changes�
The Navy already has made organizational changes and programmatic deci-
sions to speed the development of the MQ-25 Stingray and UAS technology, but 
fielding the MQ-25 Stingray will be only one step toward realizing the potential 
of the CL-UAV innovation� The Navy should complement its pursuit of technol-
ogy by organizing to develop a CL-UAV constituency within the carrier aviation 
community and to encourage experimentation and bottom-up innovation� Orga-
nizational decisions should be based on empirical analyses of the attitudes of car-
rier aviators, especially within the strike fighter community, to understand fully 
the cultural and institutional barriers to CL-UAV integration and experimenta-
tion� Organizations and processes also should be designed to adopt bottom-up 
innovations rapidly and to exploit the role of end users in refining the require-
ments for future innovation and follow-on CL-UAVs� Experimentation should 
be prioritized and, when possible, the responsibility for experimentation should 
be assigned to dedicated organizations that are not simultaneously responsible 
for operational deployments or formal test and evaluation of programs of record�
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